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BRINGING CULTURAL GENOCIDE IN BY THE BACKDOOR:
VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT THE ICC
*

Kristina Hon
I. INTRODUCTION

Cultural genocide is the much-maligned and oft-forgotten
companion of the simply-termed concept of “genocide.” Unlike
genocide—a word used to characterize horrors such as the killings in
the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and, controversially, Darfur—cultural
1
genocide does not require the killing of a single person. In fact, no
2
physical harm need ever befall a victim of cultural genocide. That is
3
because cultural genocide strips from humanity all manner of
cultural contributions by human groups, through the destruction of
those artifacts, documents, books, monuments, or even languages
*
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1
Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide Debate: Should the UN Genocide
Convention Include a Provision on Cultural Genocide or Should the Phenomenon be
Encompassed in a Separate International Treaty?, 22 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 99, 100 (2009).
2
Id.
3
Scholars have used various other terms to describe the concept of cultural
genocide. “Ethnocide” is the most frequent one; it was originally coined by Raphael
Lemkin (who also coined “genocide”) who considered it to be interchangeable with
“genocide.” RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 n.1 (1944)
(“Another term could be used for the same idea, namely, ethnocide, consisting of the
Greek word ‘ethnos’—nation—and the Latin word ‘cide.’”). Since then, however, it
has been interpreted to mean “the [systematic] destruction of a culture without the
killing of its bearers,” which is more along the lines of the contemporary definition
of cultural genocide. Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh
Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 67 (2008) (quoting FRANK CHALK & KURT
JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND CASE STUDIES 8–
10 (1990)). This concept has also been directly, as well as indirectly, expressed in
international documents. See, e.g., UNESCO Declaration of San Jose (Unesco and
the struggle against ethnocide), U.N.E.S.C.O. Doc. FS 82/WF32 (Dec. 11, 1981)
(“Ethnocide means that an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and
transmit its own culture and its own language, whether collectively or individually.”).
This tautological distinction has no bearing on this Comment or relevant legal
analysis.
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4

that embody the group’s identity. More simply, it is nothing more or
less than the total destruction of a culture so as to obliterate the
5
identity of a people. As such, a culture and identity can be destroyed
6
“even if all the members of the group [are] still alive.”
It is, of course, an extraordinarily rare occurrence that cultural
genocide happens on its own, without any kind of physical abuse
7
simultaneously inflicted on the victims.
More often than not,
cultural genocide is wrapped up in, and overshadowed by, physical
8
violence. A prime example of this is occurring today in Darfur,
9
Sudan. The forcible displacement and annihilation of villages and
communal societies is wrenching the three primarily-targeted tribes
10
from their land, their communities, and their cultural base. The
Government of Sudan forces, in conjunction with the Janjaweed
militia, have pursued a ruthless policy of “killings, rapes, [and]
burning of villages . . . against non-Arab villagers” in “multiple attacks
over a prolonged period [of time resulting in the destruction of the
villages] by burning, shelling or bombing, making it impossible for
11
the villagers to return.” The Arab versus non-Arab tension fueling
the conflict—and generally underpinning the government’s “ArabIslamic supremacist and demonizing policies”—has materialized in
the violent struggle for the “incentives” of “[t]he property,
possessions, livestock, and the cultivated land itself” of the non-Arabs
12
living in Darfur.
Darfur, while being the most recent illustration of genocide, is
4

G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(1) (Dec. 11, 1946); U.N. Secretariat,
First Draft of the Genocide Convention, U.N. Doc. E/447 (May 1947), available at
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/drafts/.
5
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 100.
6
Id. at 102 (emphasis omitted).
7
See, e.g., Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 104–05 (discussion on Nazi German
policies).
8
Id.
9
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY
GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN 5 VOL. 16:6(A) (May 2004),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0504full.pdf
[hereinafter DARFUR DESTROYED].
10
Micol Sirkin, Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic Cleansing: A Return
to Established Principles in Light of Contemporary Interpretations, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
489, 516–17 (2010).
11
The Crisis in Darfur: Hearing Before the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., 108th Cong.
(2004) (statement of Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State), available at
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2004-09-09-8-Text.html.
12
JOHN HAGAN & WENONA RYMOND-RICHMOND, DARFUR AND THE CRIME OF
GENOCIDE 5 (2009).
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but one in a succession. The term “genocide” was coined in 1943 by
13
a Polish law professor, Raphael Lemkin, as a combination of the
Greek word “genos” or “genus” meaning race, and the Latin word
14
“cide” meaning killing (as in homicide or fratricide). He used it to
describe the Armenian decimation by the Turks during World War I,
but the concept became firmly embedded in legal and political
terminology when he applied it to the German Nazis’ policies to
exterminate the Jews and the Roma throughout Europe prior to and
15
during World War II. Lemkin’s definition of genocide was a very
broad and holistic one, and reflective of the wide variety of
destructive measures employed by the Nazis, encompassing the
“disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture,
language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of
national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty,
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to
16
such groups.” For Lemkin, the destruction of the lives of the victims
seemed almost an afterthought, as if taking their lives was, while
cruel, an act of mercy in comparison to the annihilation unleashed
17
on their culture, society, and identity.
Applying his own definition of genocide to the Nazi practices
during World War II, Lemkin concluded that genocide had occurred
through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of
the captive peoples: in the political field (by destroying
institutions of self-government and imposing a German
pattern of administration, and through colonization by
13

Raphael Lemkin was born in the early 1900s in eastern Poland and worked in
Poland “as a lawyer, prosecutor and university teacher.” WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2000). In 1939, he fled Poland, escaping the
Jewish persecution, eventually settling in the United States. Id. By that time, he was
renowned as an international criminal law scholar, and taught at universities across
the United States. Id. In 1943, he published his seminal book Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe, consolidating and expounding upon the legal theories behind genocide and
exhaustively analyzing Nazi policies and practices within Germany and the occupied
territories in light of international criminal law. Id. at 26–27.
14
LEMKIN, supra note 3, at xi; Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 100.
15
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 99; see LEMKIN, supra note 3.
16
LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 79.
17
In his book, Lemkin wrote,
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate
destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of
all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated
plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the
groups themselves.
Id.
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Germans); the social field (by disrupting the social
cohesion of the nation involved and killing or removing
elements such as the intelligentsia, which provide spiritual
leadership—according to Hitler’s statement in Mein Kampf,
“the greatest of spirits can be liquidated if its bearer is
beaten to death with a rubber truncheon”); in the cultural
field (by prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and
cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for
education in the liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic
thinking, which the occupant considers dangerous because
it promotes national thinking); in the economic field (by
shifting the wealth to Germans and by prohibiting the
exercise of trades and occupations by people who do not
promote Germanism “without reservations”); in the
biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by
promoting procreation by Germans in the occupied
countries); in the field of physical existence (by introducing
a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by mass
killings, mainly of Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians); in
the religious field (by interfering with the activities of the
Church, which in many countries provides not only spiritual
but also national leadership); in the field of morality (by
attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement
through promoting pornographic publications and motion
18
pictures, and the excessive consumption of alcohol).
The literal translation of genocide is “the killing of a race,” and
of course the most expeditious and easiest way to achieve the physical
obliteration of the very existence, nay the very foundation, of a
19
particular group of people is by destroying the people themselves.
That is not to say, however, that cultural genocide does not happen,
20
and has not happened, independent of physical violence. Yet it is
far more frequently the case that cultural destruction and
obliteration occur within the context of an armed conflict, blurring
the lines between culture, identity, and regular violence and
extermination. Darfur is one such compelling example. When
courts and tribunals prosecute the physical genocide, the cultural
21
genocide is subsumed within it, and is thus punished as well. But
that still cannot sufficiently address the gravity of the harm being
18

LEMKIN, supra note 3, at xi–xii.
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 100.
20
Forcible transfer of children is one such example; see infra note 4733 for a
historical overview.
21
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 124.
19
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done, as “[t]he living may suffer cultural genocide without death,”
and without being “vindicated by the prosecution of physical
22
genocide.”
The comparative lack of severity, potentially, of cultural
genocide compared to physical genocide has led to the
marginalization of the concept and a lack of appreciation—legal and
societal—for the destructive effect that obliteration of a cultural
23
identity has on its people, whether or not accompanied by killing.
While cultural genocide is not a distinct crime under international
law and is not included in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), a new feature in the Statute allowing for the
legal participation of qualified victims has the potential to inject a
24
cultural perspective into the proceedings.
The concept is still
largely theoretical, but this Comment will argue that cultural
genocide deserves to be recognized; it would therefore behoove the
prosecutor and the legal representatives of the victims to pay special
attention to the impact that a more culturally-nuanced approach
would have on the prosecution of genocide and war crimes. This
could become particularly important in the trial of Sudanese
president Omar al-Bashir, the only person thus far to be indicted by
25
the ICC on charges of genocide.
More universally, however,
establishing a precedent for the inclusion of the cultural background
of a conflict and a mechanism for addressing harms inflicted upon
that culture is imperative because the unfortunate fact is that cultural
genocide is likely to occur again in the future, if the past is any guide.
When it does, there must be ways to address it, directly and indirectly.
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of the evolution
of the legal status of cultural genocide. Part III will discuss how the
innovative victim participation model at the ICC works and how it can
be used to integrate evidence of cultural genocide in proving the
specific intent required for the conviction of the crime of genocide.
Part IV will apply the theoretical principles enumerated in Part III to
the Omar al-Bashir case, by analyzing and extrapolating from the pretrial chamber’s initial refusal but eventual grant of a warrant of arrest
for al-Bashir for genocide.
22

Id. at 125.
See infra Part II.A.1 for discussion on the second justification for excluding
cultural genocide from the Genocide Convention.
24
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 68, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
25
Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial
Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95, July 12, 2010.
23
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL GENOCIDE
Raphael Lemkin’s comprehensive definition of genocide—
encompassing harm done to all aspects of human life—provided the
ideal starting point for the creation of a legal regime to identify,
26
define, and criminalize genocide. Despite much discussion about,
and interpretations of, cultural genocide during the drafting sessions
of the Genocide Convention, and several attempts to include it in the
final version, the concept was nevertheless excluded. Since then, the
international legal community has slowly raised the legal status of
cultural genocide to its current role as one means of showing specific
intent to commit genocide under the Genocide Convention and the
27
respective statutes of the international criminal tribunals and courts.
A. The Genocide Convention
The atrocities committed by the Nazi regime in Europe during
the Second World War so shocked the conscience of the
international community that the states were galvanized into giving
these acts “a name and a legal definition” so as to better come to
28
terms with them.
The newly-created United Nations General
Assembly (GA) convened in 1946 and passed Resolution 96(1), which
made genocide an international crime, requested member states to
pass domestic legislation punishing and preventing the crime, and
instructed the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to begin
29
drafting an international convention delineating the crime. The
committee of experts selected to review the preliminary document
included Raphael Lemkin, and his influence was clearly visible in the
30
drafts, especially the first one.
Lemkin’s definition of genocide encompassed three primary
31
types of genocide: physical, biological, and cultural.
Physical
genocide was defined as “the tangible annihilation of the group by
killing and maiming its members,” and Lemkin provided a range of
examples, from Nazi policies of racial discrimination in the
distribution or rationing of food, endangering of health, and mass
26

LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 79.
See infra Part II.C.1.
28
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 112.
29
G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(1) (Dec. 11, 1946); Nehemiah
Robinson, The Genocide Convention: Its Origins and Interpretations, 40 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 315, app. 2 (2007).
30
Robinson, supra note 29, at 2.
31
LEMKIN, supra note 3, at xi–xii, 82–90; Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 102.
27
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32

killings.
He defined biological genocide as the “imposi[tion of]
measures calculated to decrease the reproductive capacity of the
group,” including policies of separation of the sexes and deportation,
33
involuntary sterilization, and undernourishment of the parents.
Broadly defined, cultural genocide encompassed “attacks [beyond]
the physical and/or biological elements of a group . . . seek[ing] to
34
eliminate its wider institutions.” Such an elimination policy could
be accomplished through the prohibition of the use of a local
language and schools, the restriction or ban of artistic, literary, and
cultural activities, and the destruction or confiscation of “national
35
treasures, libraries, archives, museums, artifacts, and art galleries.”
These three main forms of genocide also subsumed additional
dimensions or “techniques” of genocide, including “political,
36
social, . . . economic, . . . religious and moral” genocide.
The provisions on genocide contained in the first draft that
Lemkin and his colleagues reviewed bore a striking resemblance to
37
the trichotomy framework Lemkin had enunciated. It made each
type of genocide a separate crime, defining it and enumerating the
38
actions that would be punishable under the convention. The crime
of cultural genocide was defined as
[d]estroying the specific characteristics of the group by: (a)
forcible transfer of children to another human group; or
(b) forced and systematic exile of individuals representing
the culture of a group; or (c) prohibition of the use of the
national language even in private intercourse; or (d)
systematic destruction of books printed in the national
language or of religious works or prohibition of new
publications; or (e) systematic destruction of historical or
religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses,
destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of
32

LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 87–90; David Nersessian, Rethinking Cultural Genocide
Under International Law, Human Rights Dialogue: Cultural Rights, CARNEGIE COUNCIL
(Apr. 22, 2005), http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/publications/dialogue
/2_12/section_1/5139.html.
33
LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 86; Nersessian, supra note 32.
34
Nersessian, supra note 32.
35
LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 84; Nersessian, supra note 32.
36
LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 87–90; Kurt Mundorff, Other People’s Children: A Textual
and Contextual Interpretation of the Genocide Convention, Article 2(e), 50 HARV. INT’L L. J.
61, 74 (2009); Nersessian, supra note 32.
37
Compare Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi, 82–90, with First Draft of the Genocide
Convention, supra note 4.
38
First Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4.
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historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in
39
religious worship.
The listing of the specific criminal actions tried to incorporate, as
best as possible, the various facets of the destruction of a cultural
identity, in some ways going beyond what Lemkin had envisioned,
40
such as with the inclusion of forcible transfer of children.
After the first draft was submitted to the United Nations (U.N.)
member states, and ECOSOC had received the states’ comments and
observations, a new ad hoc committee was formed to draft a second
41
version of the convention.
The resulting draft eliminated the
previous draft’s trichotomy by combining physical and biological
genocide into a single article; it also drastically curtailed the
definition of cultural genocide, excising all references to acts
committed against people, focusing strictly on the destruction of
42
tangible items. The only exception pertained to the use of a local or
43
group language. The punishable actions, therefore, included only
the
prohibiti[on of] the use of the language of the group in
daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and
circulation of publications in the language of the group;
[and the] destr[uction] or preventi[on of] the use of
libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places
of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the
44
group.
The final version eventually submitted to the GA for adoption by
the states parties—what then became the Convention on the
45
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide —had
entirely re-worked the breakdown of the types of genocide. The
distinctions between physical, biological, and cultural genocide had
been removed, leaving only a list of five specifically enumerated acts

39

Id. at art. II(3).
See generally LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 84–85.
41
Robinson, supra note 29, at 5.
42
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Ad Hoc Comm., Second Draft of the Genocide
Convention, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25.1–28, art. III (May 10, 1948), available at
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/drafts/.
43
Id. at art. III(1).
44
Id. at art. III.
45
The Convention entered into force in January 1951, after the UN General
Assembly adopted it on 9 October 1948. SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 3; Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/260 (III)A (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
40
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46

that were to be considered genocide. The only remnant of cultural
genocide was the forcible transfer of children as one of the five acts,
the inclusion of which had been proposed by the Greek delegation
47
and approved.
Two final attempts had been made to reinstate
cultural genocide—in one form or another—into the Convention but
48
The
neither were able to garner support, and so both failed.
concept had been exhaustively discussed in all drafting sessions and
the overwhelming majority of the delegates agreed that the concept
was best “addressed elsewhere in the United Nations as a human
49
rights issue.”
The failure to include any substantive reference to cultural
genocide did not go unnoticed by some delegates, prompting
50
statements of admonition and regret.
A Pakistani representative
lamented the exclusion of cultural genocide, protesting that the
focus only on physical destruction of life was misplaced, because
physical genocide is simply the means by which to achieve the end,
namely “[the destruction of the] values and the very soul of a
51
national, racial or religious group”—or in other words, a culture.
46

Genocide Convention, supra note 45, at art. II.
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing seriously
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.

Id.
47

Robinson, supra note 29, at 18. The forcible removal and transfer of
children—which destroys culture through the forced assimilation of the future
generation—has a history of occurrence, as it occurred in Cornwellian England, in
Australia, Canada and the United States in the nineteenth century, in Switzerland
against the Roma, and in the Soviet Union against indigenous Siberians, in the
twentieth century. Mundorff, supra note 36, at 63–64; Robinson, supra note 29, at 18.
More contemporarily, during the Cold War, Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu
severely discriminated against and repressed ethnic Hungarians on such a scale as to
constitute cultural genocide. Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 128. Examples of
governmental policies employed included: “1. elimination of minority educational
institutions, 2. suppression of minority languages, 3. falsification of historical data
and population statistics, 4. confiscation of cultural archives, 5. obstruction of contact
with relatives abroad, and 6. dissolution of ethnic communities.” Id. at 129.
48
Mundorff, supra note 36, at 77. One proposal was by the Soviet Union, which
was voted down, and the other was by Venezuela, which later withdrew it. Id.
49
SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 73. For a more in-depth discussion, see Part II.A.1.
50
See generally Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 114–15.
51
Id.
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Thus, if physical genocide was to be a crime, so too should cultural
52
Failure to properly deter crimes against culture,
genocide.
religions, or language could lead to brazen attacks against them,
53
which would be outside the scope of international criminal law.
1.

Justifications for the Exclusion of Cultural Genocide

Despite such strong arguments in favor of criminalizing cultural
genocide, the concept was left out of the Convention for five
54
55
reasons. The first was that the concept was simply too imprecise.
While it is true that the concept encompasses a broad spectrum of
crimes, the two definitions promulgated in the drafts of the
convention would seem to be evidence that in fact, the concept can
56
be sufficiently concretely defined, even if controversially.
The
second reason was the comparative lack of severity of the physical
harm; the gap between the severity of mass murder and the closure of
57
libraries was just too large. This is an undeniable fact, since human
life is not threatened by the banning of books or use of languages to
the same extent as physical violence. The underpinnings of society,
culture, and communities, however, are so threatened by prohibitions
on books and languages, thereby lowering quality of life and
weakening identity.
The third reason was that many delegations felt that cultural
destruction was best dealt with in “the sphere of protection of
minorities” or human rights law, and therefore outside the
58
framework of international criminal law. This justification, while
valid on its face, does not consider that it is not always the majority
that oppresses the minority, and that groups of equal strength and
population might also wish to eliminate the other’s culture in a fight
for dominance and power. Also, it presupposes that cultural
genocide—or cultural destruction—will be easier to articulate as a
different branch of international law. Relatedly, states felt that there
were valid and legitimate justifications for the implementation of

52

Id. at 115.
Id.
54
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 115; Robinson, supra note 29, at 18–19; Sirkin,
supra note 10, at 504.
55
Robinson, supra note 29, at 19.
56
See First Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4, at art. I(II)(3); Second
Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 42, at art. III.
57
Robinson, supra note 29, at 19.
58
Id.
53
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measures domestically to incorporate and assimilate minorities.
Indeed there are such justifiable reasons; the point of the
criminalization of cultural genocide, however, is to protect groups
against measures and actions that would go beyond the realm of the
legitimate and into the realm of outright annihilation and
destruction. That is precisely what the concept is designed to
safeguard. The final reason was that codification of cultural genocide
would be best deferred to a separate international convention, to
60
allow for proper and full development of all its legal nuances. This
reason was undoubtedly an altruistic one, but a “Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Cultural Genocide” has never
materialized; as such, the international community missed the perfect
opportunity to make cultural genocide a definite, punishable crime
under international law, leaving its status under international law
vague and its potential unrealized.
B. Subsequent Development of Cultural Rights
Since then, various international treaties and declarations have
incorporated references to cultural rights, mainly as human rights,
61
but none have ever re-articulated the concept of cultural genocide.
For example, the International Bill of Rights—composed of the
62
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the International
63
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
59

Sirkin, supra note 10, at 504.
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 115.
61
Another difference is that many of the rights can be classified as “freedom to”
(or positive) rights rather than “freedom from” (or negative) rights, meaning that
peoples are affirmatively allowed to participate and engage in various cultural
activities, as opposed to being granted protection from governmental interference in
those activities. Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 864
(2001) (A negative right “is a right to be free from government, while [a positive
right] is a right to command government action.”). The Genocide Convention
enshrines “freedom from” rights. See generally Athanasios Yupsanis, The Concept and
Categories of Cultural Rights in International Law—Their Broad Sense and the Relevant
Clauses of the International Human Rights Treaties, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 207,
220–24, 233–34 (2010). The distinction is largely irrelevant for this Comment.
62
“Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person and in the equal rights of men and women. . . .” Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
63
“Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone can enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and
cultural rights . . . .” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
60
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International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
64
(ICESCR) —provides that human rights can be classified into five
65
But of
categories: civil, political, economic, social, and cultural.
these groups, civil and political rights receive the greatest legal and
66
scholarly attention; cultural, the least. The biggest exception to this
is the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), whose documents embrace a broad concept of culture as
a way of life: a “set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and
emotional features of society or a social group, and . . .
encompass[ing], in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of
67
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.” Nevertheless,
the UNESCO definition is not a legal definition; it is not contained in
a document under which cultures may bring suit against their
aggressors (whether domestically or internationally) for
68
encroachment on their social and cultural cohesion.
The international document that comes closest to protecting
against interference with, and destruction of, culture—the essence of
cultural genocide—is the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
69
Indigenous Peoples. Articles 7 and 8 both grant affirmative rights
stemming from the enjoyment and proliferation of a culture and
2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Mar. 23, 1976).
64
“Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone can enjoy his economic,
social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights. . . .” International
Covenant in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Jan. 3, 1976).
65
Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 207.
66
Id. at 208.
67
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, U.N.E.S.C.O. Res.
31/25,
Annex
I,
U.N.
Doc.
__
(Nov.
2,
2001),
available
at
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
68
The principles in the Declaration are enumerations of positive rights. See
discussion supra note 47. As they are much harder to enforce, the Declaration
confines itself to stating that
the Member States recommend that the Director-General take the
objectives set forth in this Action Plan into account in the
implementation of UNESCO’s programmes and communicate it to
institutions of the United Nations system and to other
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned
with a view to enhancing the synergy of actions in favour of cultural
diversity.
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 67, at Annex II.
69
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
Annex, art. 7 & 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295/Annex (Sept. 13, 2007).

HON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2013 3:37 PM

371

COMMENT
70

protect against “assimilation or destruction of [that] culture.” This
is a progressive step, but it suffers from two main drawbacks. First,
the Declaration was created almost sixty years after the adoption of
the Genocide Convention, meaning that any violations in the nature
of those two articles committed during that time are essentially
71
Even still, as with the UNESCO
sheltered from prosecution.
72
declaration, there is no avenue for international redress. Second, it
73
applies only to the indigenous, leaving out minorities. Most other
international documents that deal with culture either protect
74
tangible items or the rights of specific groups.
C. International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and its
Jurisprudence
The next impetus for the international community to potentially
address the absence of cultural genocide from any international
treaty or convention was in the early 1990s, as the United Nations
75
dealt with the aftermath of the wars in Yugoslavia.
In order to
70

Id.
Article 7. 1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and
mental integrity, liberty and security of person. 2. Indigenous peoples
have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as
distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or
any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the
group to another group. Article 8. 1. Indigenous peoples and
individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or
destruction of their culture. . . .

Id.
71

MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 926 (6th ed. 2008) (“In the absence of
contrary intention, the treaty will not operate retroactively so that its provisions will
not bind a party as regards any facts, acts or situations prior to that state’s acceptance
of the treaty.”).
72
The Declaration confines itself to stating that “the United Nations, its bodies,
including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies,
including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for and full
application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness of
this Declaration.” U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note
69, at art. 42.
73
Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 230. The distinction is important because while the
indigenous may be a minority within a country, “minorit[ies]” are not otherwise
legally defined under international law and are not recognized as a “people” and
therefore are not entitled to such rights as self-determination. Id. at 230–31.
74
Such conventions include the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention; the
2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity; the 1989 Convention on the Rights
of the Child; the 2003 Convention on Migrant Workers; and the 1981 Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Anayiotos, supra
note 1, at 115–19; Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 219.
75
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 119.
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provide accountability for the terrible crimes being committed, the
U.N. Security Council established the International Criminal
76
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993. The tribunal
was accompanied by, and founded on, a statute by which to prosecute
77
those accused of the crimes enumerated within it.
The statute
included provisions for the punishment of grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (article 2); violations of the laws or
customs of war (article 3); genocide (article 4); and crimes against
78
humanity (article 5). In articulating the definition of genocide, the
statute repeats verbatim the iteration contained in the Genocide
79
Convention. Accordingly, it does not include cultural genocide as a
punishable crime.
That did not mean, however, that cultural genocide as a concept
was legally irrelevant; the ICTY first encountered the task of
determining the legal status of cultural genocide in Prosecutor v.
80
Radislav Krstić.
Krstić was charged with genocide, complicity to
commit genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity,
murder as a crime against humanity, murder as a violation of the laws
81
of war, and persecution.
Krstić had been a commander in the Bosnian Serb Army whose
corps had participated in the attack on the United Nations safe area
at Srebrenica, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Bosnian Muslim
82
83
men and boys. In its 260-page judgment, the trial chamber was
obliged to assess the meaning of the words “intent to destroy,” proof

76

Id.
Id. at 119–20.
78
The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), Annex, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Report of the
Secretary-General].
79
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 120.
80
Id. at 121.
81
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Initial Indictment, ¶¶ 20–30 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 30, 1998).
82
Id. at ¶¶ 2–12.
83
The ICTY is composed of the following organs: three trial chambers and an
appeals chamber, the prosecutor, and the registry. Report of the Secretary-General,
supra note 78, at Annex art. 11. The trial chamber is charged with reviewing the
indictments of each accused, confirming or dismissing them; issuing “orders and
warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer” of the accused; conducting
the trial; rendering a judgment; and “impos[ing] sentences and penalties on persons
convicted of serious violations of international humanitarian law.” Id. at art. 19–20,
23.
77
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of which is requisite for a conviction of genocide.
After it
determined that specific intent—or dolus specialis—was required for
genocide, and not merely a “general awareness” of the consequences
of one’s actions, the chamber discussed the “manner in which the
85
destruction of a group may be implemented . . . .” The chamber
acknowledged that, aside from physical acts, “one may also conceive
of destroying a group through purposeful eradication of its culture
and identity resulting in the eventual extinction of the group as an
86
entity distinct from the remainder of the community.”
Continuing its analysis, the trial chamber conceded that as
Lemkin had originally conceived, genocide encompassed “all forms
87
of destruction of a group as a distinct social entity.” Such a broad
interpretation of the definition resembled what had been
incorporated as a crime against humanity into the Statute of the
88
Nuremberg Tribunal established after World War II. This definition
was then later subsumed into the ICTY statute (and even later into
the Rome Statute forming the ICC), as persecution under the
89
category of crime against humanity.
Nevertheless, and despite other developments in international
90
law, the trial chamber stayed within the conservative parameters of
the language in the statute and limited the definition of genocide to
84

Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), ¶¶ 569–
70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001). This high standard of
intent is present in the Genocide Convention, the ICTY statute, the statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Rome Statute of the ICC. See
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 6; Genocide Convention, supra note 45, at art. 2;
S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Report of the
Secretary-General, supra note 78, at Annex art. 4.
85
Krstić (trial chamber judgment), at ¶¶ 571, 574.
86
Id. at ¶ 574.
87
Id. at ¶ 575.
88
Id. At Nuremberg, the U.S. Military Tribunal had interpreted persecution in
the Ulrich Greifelt et al. case broadly, to cover extermination of the characteristics of
ethnic and national groups. Id. at ¶ 575. “The acts, conduct, plans and
enterprises . . . were carried out as part of a systematic program of genocide, aimed
at the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups, in part by murderous
extermination, and in part by elimination and suppression of national
characteristics.” Id. at n.1282 (quoting U.S.A. v. Ulrich Greifelt et al., TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, VOL. XIV (1948)).
89
Krstić (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 575.
90
Such developments include a U.N. General Assembly resolution and a
decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court, both of which recognized
ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide. Id. at ¶¶ 578–79. A judicial opinion by a
domestic court is not generally considered as a source of international law. See
generally Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, U.N. Charter Annex.
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those physical and biological acts that cause the destruction of a
group—those five specifically enumerated in its statute, as taken from
91
the Genocide Convention. “Hence, an enterprise attacking only the
cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to
annihilate these elements which give to that group its own identity
distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the
92
definition of genocide.”
1.

Cultural Genocide as Proof of Specific Intent

The chamber did recognize, however, that very often, physical
and biological attacks are accompanied by destruction of “cultural
and religious property and symbols of the targeted group,” in an
93
effort to obliterate all evidence of that group’s identity. As such,
those types of acts—if substantiated by the evidence—may well be
considered as part of the proof of the specific intent to physically
94
destroy that group. Indeed, that is what the trial chamber did; in
finding Krstić guilty of genocide, it considered as evidence of the
requisite specific intent “the deliberate destruction of mosques and
95
houses belonging to” the Bosnian Muslims.
Appeal Chamber Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen supported the
proposition the trial chamber enumerated in its judgment against
Krstić—that evidence of cultural genocide or destruction can be used
96
to supplement a finding of specific intent. In his partial dissenting
opinion appended to the chamber’s judgment of the Krstić case,
Judge Shahabuddeen articulated a more nuanced version of cultural
97
genocide. He recognized that cultural genocide was intentionally
left out of the Genocide Convention, but stated that:
If those characteristics [—often intangible—that ‘bind . . .
together a collection of people as a social unit’] have been
91

Krstić (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 580.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Krstić’s conviction of genocide was replaced by a conviction of aiding and
abetting the commission of genocide, based on a finding by the Appeals Chamber of
a lack of specific intent, but the legal principles enumerated by the trial chamber as
regards evidence of cultural destruction as one indication of such intent remained
unchanged.
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Appeals
Chamber), ¶¶ 134, 144 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
97
Id. (appeals chamber, partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen);
William A. Schabas, Genocide Law in a Time of Transition: Recent Developments in the Law
of Genocide, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 161, 171–72 (2008).
92
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destroyed in pursuance of the intent with which a listed act
of a physical or biological nature was done, it is not
convincing to say that the destruction, though effectively
obliterating the group, is not genocide because the
98
obliteration was not physical or biological.
The crime of genocide “is a crime against human groups,” “not a
99
crime against individuals.”
As such, if acts taken to destroy the
tangible and intangible characteristics of such a human group
effectively lead to its destruction, it should be no defense against a
charge of genocide that the specific acts committed were not those
specifically listed as physical or biological in the ICTY Statute or the
100
The genocidal intent must always be to
Genocide Convention.
destroy the group; but evidence of such intent should not be—and
101
historically is not—limited to physical or biological acts. Therefore,
acts of cultural destruction should be weighed as heavily as the
physical and biological acts in determining genocide.
ICTY chambers adjudicating other genocide cases have
interpreted Judge Shahabuddeen’s dissent to support an expansion
of the definition of genocide in the grey areas, where ethnic hatred—
and resulting cultural crimes—is rampant, but there is little evidence
102
that actual physical destruction of the people was intended.
“The
destruction of culture may serve evidentially to confirm an intent, to
be gathered from other circumstances, to destroy the group, as such,”
103
without any manifestation of physical violence.
The trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Blagojević adopted the
dichotomy between requiring the criminal acts to be physical or
biological, but allowing the intent to take other forms enumerated by
104
Judge Shahabuddeen.
The chamber recognized, as Judge
98

Krstić (appeals chamber judgment, partial dissenting opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen), at ¶ 50.
99
Id. (internal citations omitted).
100
Id.
101
Id. at ¶ 51.
102
Schabas, supra note 97, at 172.
103
Krstić (appeals chamber judgment, partial dissenting opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen), at ¶ 53.
104
Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 659 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005). Blagojević was charged with
complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or
customs of war. Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-53-PT, Initial Joinder
Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 22, 2002). He was in
command of one of the brigades in charge of securing the “safe area” of Srebrenica,
“and directly participated in the actual capture” of the area and resulting executions.
Id. at ¶ 1.
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Shahabuddeen had made clear, that while the “listed acts of
genocide” must be physical or biological in nature, “the same is not
105
The intent need not be limited to
required for the intent.”
inferences from physical and biological acts. Cultural acts may be
considered, since a group whose destruction is intended “is
comprised [not only] of its individuals, but also of its history,
traditions, the relationship between its members, the relationship
106
with other groups, [and] the relationship with the land.”
Accordingly, the Blagojevich court recognized that forcible transfer
(exceeding “mere displacement”) can be genocide if “the
107
consequence is dissolution of the group.”
Forced migration of
civilians and large-scale deportation would also fall under the same
108
category. Rape and other acts of sexual violence, as acknowledged
by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), also serve
109
as evidence used to show intent to destroy.
The chamber also looked favorably upon a decision by the
110
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which, in deciding to
expand the interpretation of Germany’s statutory definition of
genocide beyond physical and biological extermination, “found that
[doing so] would not be in violation of international law and that ‘it
has generally been accepted that the limit of the meaning of the text
has been exceeded only when the intention to destroy relates solely to
111
a group’s cultural identity,’ that is, cultural genocide.”
While the
ICTY has not extended the statutory interpretation of genocide to
include cultural genocide, the premise behind such an expansion was
112
further expounded upon in Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, as the court
105

Blagojević (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 659.
Id. at ¶ 666.
107
Id. at ¶ 660.
108
Id. at ¶ 663.
109
Id. at ¶ 662.
110
Prosecutor v. Nikola Jorgić, Judgment, Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR
1290/00 (Dec. 12, 2000).
111
Blagojević (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 664 (emphasis added). The Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany in Jorgić upheld an interpretation of “destroy” to
mean “the destruction of ‘the group as a social unit in its specificity, uniqueness and
feeling of belonging [and that] the biological-physical destruction of the group is not
required.’” Id. (internal citation omitted).
112
Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 854 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006). Krajisnik was charged with
genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and [sic] customs of war,
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT00-39-T, Amended Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 21,
2000). With the goal of freeing Bosnia from unwanted Serbs, Krajisnik engaged in
106
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dissected some of the philosophy behind the actus reus/mens rea
dichotomy:
It is not accurate to speak of ‘the group’ as being amenable
to physical or biological destruction. Its members are, of
course, physical or biological beings, but the bonds among
its members, as well as such aspects of the group as its
members’ culture and beliefs, are neither physical nor
biological. Hence [under] the Genocide Convention’s
‘intent to destroy’ the group cannot sensibly be regarded as
reducible to an intent to destroy the group physically or
113
biologically. . . .
Nevertheless, the court declined to extend genocide beyond the
114
physical and biological acts listed in the ICTY Statute.
2.

Additional Cultural Provisions in the ICTY Statute

Aside from Article 4 of the ICTY statute, which deals with
genocide, Articles 2 and 3—on grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and violations of the laws of war, respectively—allow for
the prosecution of crimes against property. These could potentially
encompass cultural property, under provisions relating to: “extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;” “wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity;” “seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science” from
115
Article 3(d); and finally “plunder of public or private property.”
But none of these four provisions provide for any kind of
protection against destruction of culture through means other than
the destruction of tangible objects. Yet culture, as the cumulative
sense of identity that is built through both its embodiment in physical
objects, as well as intangible ephemera, can be threatened through
other means. There is no comparable criminalization of acts such as
the prohibition of the use of local and native languages and forcible
“the creation of impossible conditions of life, involving persecution and terror
tactics . . . ; the deportation of those who were reluctant to leave; and the liquidation
of others.” Id. at ¶ 6.
113
Krajisnik (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 854 n.1701.
114
See generally id. at ¶ 854, as a general statement of the legal use of other types
of proof of intent, including, for example, the transfer of children, severing of bonds
among group members, and deliberate forcible transfer.
115
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 78, at Annex arts. 2(d), 3(b), 3(d),
3(e).
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116

displacement.
Such types of activities are also legally considered to be
117
components of the concept of ethnic cleansing. The first problem
with such a characterization is that there is no formal legal definition,
although a U.N. Commission of Experts—investigating the atrocities
in Yugoslavia—defined it as a purposeful policy designed by one
ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring
means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group
from certain geographic areas. . . [for the] purpose [of] occupation
118
of territory to the exclusion of the purged group or groups.
The second problem is that under the development of
international tribunals’ jurisprudence, ethnic cleansing is recognized
119
neither as a stand-alone genocidal policy nor as a crime unto itself.
Interpretation of the phrase “to destroy” in the definition of genocide
“excludes” cultural genocide because destruction of a culture does
not physically destroy the victims; by extension, ethnic cleansing,
which also does not intentionally destroy the people—rather only
displaces them—is equally precluded from falling under the crime of
120
genocide.
Ethnic cleansing has only been acknowledged as
evidence of genocidal intent (like cultural genocide), meaning that
barring the additional commission of an enumerated crime in the
Genocide Convention (or ICTY Statute or Rome Statute), a state
121
policy of ethnic cleansing is not genocide.
In the same vein, the
acts committed under a policy of ethnic cleansing are not punishable
as one coherent crime; rather, each act is prosecuted on an
individual basis either as a war crime or crime against humanity
122
under the various provisions of the international criminal statutes.
This disconnect is notwithstanding the fact that the U.N. GA passed a
resolution in 1992 recognizing ethnic cleansing as a form of
116

Deportation is made criminal as a breach of the Geneva Conventions under
article 2(g)—”unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian”—and as a crime against humanity under article 5(d)—”deportation.” Id. at
art. 2(g).
117
Sirkin, supra note 10, at 500.
118
Final Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n of Experts Established Pursuant to S.C. Res.
780 (1992), § III.B, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994), available at
http://www.his.com/~twarrick/commxyu4.htm.
119
See Sirkin, supra note 10, at 489–91.
120
Id. at 502.
121
Id. at 500, 506.
122
Id. at 500 (“International courts and tribunals commonly criminalize ethnic
cleansing under the crime of deportation or forcible transfer or the crime of
persecution—both crimes against humanity.”).
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123

genocide.
In its jurisprudence, the ICTY helped to resurrect what seemed
124
to be the legally moribund concept of cultural genocide. The court
essentially carved a niche for cultural genocide: the acts considered
genocide were restricted to the five enumerated in the ICTY statute,
but other physical and cultural acts and motivations not explicitly
stated in the statute could be used to prove the specific intent behind
125
genocide.
D. The International Criminal Court
The 1990s thus saw a huge “dynamism” in, or development of,
international criminal law due to the jurisprudence produced by the
international criminal tribunals established to adjudicate the crimes
126
committed during the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
These
events also led to a newfound recognition of a need to create a
permanent international institution by which to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes—the creation of which had been
stalled for the previous fifty years, despite numerous inclinations to
127
act upon it. Finally doing so, the U.N. GA convened the Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
128
International Criminal Court, in Rome, Italy in June 1998.
Among other important issues, the Conference addressed
whether the statute of this new court—called the Rome Statute—
would adopt verbatim the definition of genocide contained in the
Genocide Convention or whether the definition would be expanded
to incorporate the newly emerging jurisprudence and analysis from
123

Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), ¶¶ 578–
79 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001); G.A. Res. 47/121, U.N.
Doc. AG/RES/47/121 (Dec. 18, 1992). GA resolutions are not law; they are only
evidence of what the international community believes is law. SHAW, supra note 71, at
88. The only way international tribunals may get around the strict parameters of
their statutes is by finding, for example, that cultural genocide or ethnic cleansing
has become criminalized under customary international law by showing widespread
conformance of state practice and opinio juris, or belief by the states that it is law. See
generally id. at 76–89.
124
See supra Part II.C.
125
See generally Krstić (trial chamber judgment), at ¶¶ 574–80.
126
Schabas, supra note 97, at 162.
127
For example, in 1989, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago suggested
that the international illegal drug trade be dealt with by the establishment of a
permanent international tribunal. See SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 90.
128
Sonali B. Shah, The Oversight of the Last Great International Institution of the
Twentieth Century: The International Criminal Court’s Definition of Genocide, 16 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 351, 372 (2002).
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129

the criminal tribunals.
Rather than engage in the same divisive
debates over the expansion of the definition that had so plagued the
committees drafting the Genocide Convention, the delegates
“resist[ed] the temptation to add new categories” and decided to use
130
the same language as in the Convention.
Cuba was the only
country to suggest incorporating new components into the
131
definition, but its proposal received little support.
Thus even
though its motivation was strategic, the international community
failed to capitalize on an auspicious opportunity to remedy the
deficiencies in the definition, and prosecution, of genocide by
including the concepts of cultural genocide and ethnic cleansing.
The provisions for the punishment of genocide contained in the
Rome Statute, which created the ICC, therefore, are identical to
those contained in the Genocide Convention and the statute for the
132
ICTY—excluding cultural genocide once again.
The Rome Statute does, however, take from the ICTY statute its
provision on the illegality of the seizures of, and destruction or
133
damage to, cultural institutions. It incorporates as a war crime, in
the context of both an international and non-international armed
134
Those objects are “buildings
conflict, attacking protected objects.
dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes,
135
[and] historical monuments.”
In addition to this second-best
option, the ICC will presumably adopt the principle of using cultural
destruction as evidence of the specific intent necessary for genocide
136
once it is confronted with a defendant charged with genocide.
Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir is currently the only person thus
137
far that the ICC has indicted for genocide, but he remains at large.
129

Id. at 376 n.136; Schabas, supra note 97, at 162.
Shah, supra note 128, at 377 (quoting Press Release, Preparatory Committee
for Establishment of International Criminal Court Discusses Definitions of
“Genocide,” “Crimes Against Humanity,” U.N. Press Release L/2762 (Mar. 26,
1996)).
131
Schabas, supra note 97, at 162.
132
See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 6.
133
See id. at art. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv).
134
Id.
135
Id. The crime also includes “hospitals or places where the sick and wounded
are collected.” Id.
136
Within international law, there is no hierarchy of courts and so the ICC need
not, but may if it so chooses, accept the rather well-established principle that attacks
on, and destruction of, culture may substantiate a finding of specific intent. See
SHAW, supra note 71, at 123, 1116.
137
See, e.g., Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir in Malawi: ICC wants answers, BBC NEWS (Oct.
20, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15384163.
130
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Despite a promising beginning for the criminalization of
cultural genocide, incorporation of the concept has been withheld
138
from international criminal conventions and statutes. It has made
piecemeal appearances in international jurisprudence, but while its
exclusion has been bemoaned by some, it has consistently been
relegated to the sidelines. Nevertheless, the ICC birthed a new
theory of legal participation, allowing for victims of the crimes
139
committed by ICC-accused to be represented before the court.
This radical mechanism has the potential to influence the way
140
cultural destruction is treated in international criminal law.
The
ICC will soon face the task of analyzing its own interpretation of
genocide during which time it will undoubtedly rely heavily on
141
previous interpretations by the ICTY. Until then, or until the Rome
142
Statute is amended by the states to include a separate provision for
the prosecution of cultural genocide—a desirable event—there is
another, more subtle way by which cultural considerations should be
presented to the court: by the certification of both natural persons
and cultural institutions as official victims of the various conflict
situations under the purview of the ICC. The ICC would be well
served by letting the victims carve a niche for themselves by
presenting to the court the cultural context of the conflicts and
crimes.
III. THE NOVEL APPROACH TO VICTIM PARTICIPATION
The Rome Statute of the ICC contains a new and revolutionary
provision that allows for victims to participate in a legal capacity—not
merely as witnesses or recipients of reparations—throughout most
stages of the accountability process, from the investigation stage
143
through the trial itself. Neither the ICTY nor its sister tribunal set
138

See Genocide Convention, supra note 45; Report of the Secretary-General, supra note
78; Rome Statute, supra note 24.
139
See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 68(3).
140
Gioia Greco, Victims’ Rights Overview Under the ICC Legal Framework: A
Jurisprudential Analysis, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 531, 533 (2007) (“[Victims’] involvement
in trials and cooperation in the pursuit of criminal prosecution advanced . . . the
application of international criminal law.”).
141
See Amal Alamuddin, Collection of Evidence, in PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 235–36 (Karim A.A. Khan et al. ed., 2010).
142
Amendments may be proposed by any state party to the Rome Statute. Rome
Statute, supra note 24, at art. 121 (“After the expiry of seven years from the entry into
force of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto.”).
143
Id.; Miriam Cohen, Victims’ Participation Rights Within the International Criminal
Court: A Critical Overview, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 351, 351 (2009).
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up for Rwanda provide for a similar participatory-rights scheme.
One of the main justifications for this novel institution is that the
overwhelming function of the ICC is truth-finding, and victims,
having experienced first-hand the crimes at issue, are in a good
145
position to help the ICC accomplish that mission. Granting victims
a larger participatory role also ensures that the ICC will address their
concerns—not only for accountability but also for justice (both
146
communal and individual) and reconciliation. As with much at the
ICC, one of the drawbacks of this scheme is that the jurisprudence
assessing and analyzing the boundaries, scope, and modalities of
victim participation is still developing and is therefore quite fluid (as
147
well as vague and contradictory).
A. Modes of Participation
The Rome Statute provides primarily for two avenues of
participatory rights: (1) a very narrow and specific route based on
Articles 15(3) and 19, which strictly delineates what role victims may
play in initiating investigations and challenging jurisdiction and
148
admissibility, respectively; and (2) a much broader, and therefore
more ambiguous, route founded on Article 68(3), which allows
149
victims to generally participate in “proceedings.”
1.

Narrow Preliminary Rights

Article 15 allows “victims [to] make representations to the Pre150
Trial Chamber” (PTC) when the prosecutor has decided that she
144

Cohen, supra note 143, at 352. Some civil law systems, however, mainly in
Europe, do allow for active participation by the victims. Id. at 352 n.11.
145
Id. at 351, 353.
146
Id. at 353.
147
Id.
148
The concept of admissibility refers to whether the ICC may hear the case in
the first place. The court must decline cases that are “being investigated or
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry” it out; “the case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person
concerned;” “the person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the
subject of the complaint;” and “the case is not of sufficient gravity.” Rome Statute,
supra note 24, at art. 17(1).
149
Cohen, supra note 143, at 353, 358, 360.
150
The court is composed of the presidency, the appeals division, the trial
division and the pre-trial division, the office of the prosecutor, and the registry.
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 34. The pre-trial chambers are tasked with, inter
alia, evaluating the legal and evidentiary requirements—a “reasonable basis”—for
initiating an investigation; taking preliminary steps to “ensure the efficiency and
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has sufficient evidence to request an authorization of an investigation
151
In that way, the victims may help to support the
from the PTC.
prosecutor’s case before the chamber, as the chamber makes a
determination as to whether “there is a reasonable basis” that the case
“fall[s] within the jurisdiction of the court” and that therefore an
152
investigation into the alleged crimes would be substantiated. Aside
from receiving authorization from the PTC, the prosecutor “may
153
initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information” that
may be provided by various victims’ organizations and non154
governmental organizations, thus “triggering” the investigation.
Direct victim participation may also put some pressure on the
prosecutor to begin an investigation even if it is within the
prosecutor’s discretion whether to proceed—or at least begin making
155
preliminary inquiries.
Having such roles is very important for the
victims because they will be able to gain access to all public
information about the conflict at issue from a very early stage in the
proceedings, as well as be able to add to the accumulation of
156
information, which will be to the benefit of the prosecutor.
Article 19 allows for victims who have already engaged with the
court in some legal capacity to raise questions of jurisdiction or
157
admissibility to the PTC. There are two principal restrictions to this
right of participation. The first is that it is only available to those
victims who have “already communicated with the Court in relation
158
to the case,” thereby precluding new participants.
The second is
that it can only be exercised within a case, and not merely a
159
This distinction between a situation and a case—
situation.
integrity of the proceedings” and “protect the rights of the defence [sic];” issuing
warrants and summonses; protecting the privacy and security of victims and
witnesses, preserving evidence, protecting those arrested, and protecting national
security information. Id. at art. 53, 56–58.
151
Id. at art. 15(3).
152
Id. at art. 15(4).
153
Of one’s own accord. Ex Proprio Motu, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (9th ed.
2009).
154
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 15(1); Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspects of
Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the International Criminal Court, 90 INT’L REV. OF
THE RED CROSS 870, 427 (2008).
155
Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 427.
156
Cohen, supra note 143, at 358.
157
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 19(3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3, Sept. 3–10 2002, Rule 59
[hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
158
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 157, at rule 59.
159
Cohen, supra note 143, at 361.
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extrapolated from the structure of the Rome Statute—is very
important, as it features heavily in the nature of proceedings at the
ICC and often determines the extent of victim participation at a
160
particular stage of a trial. The difference between a “situation” and
a “case” is that a situation is defined by “temporal, territorial and
personal parameters” and is the proceeding by which a
determination is made as to “whether the facts alleged should give
161
rise to a criminal investigation.”
More colloquially, it is the
investigation into an event, incident, or spate of violence during
which time the prosecutor determines who, if anyone, bears
162
responsibility for international criminal law violations.
The end
result is the filing of a request for a warrant of arrest (or summons to
appear) with a pre-trial chamber charging the alleged perpetrators
163
with crimes under the Rome Statute.
A case, on the other hand,
refers to the adjudication of “specific incidents . . . among the crimes
164
within the jurisdiction of the Court” “with one or more specific
165
suspects occurring within a situation under investigation,” which
166
follows “the issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons to appear.”
In essence, a case encompasses the full spectrum of a trial of an
accused, from indictment to final judgment on the merits.
2.

Broad Rights in a Situation and Case

The broader rights that victims have under the Rome Statute,
while seemingly explicit, are much less straightforward and are
167
therefore more open to interpretation.
There are more
requirements for participation and distinctions exist between who
168
qualifies to participate in a situation and a case. But the modes of
participation are much greater once these qualifications are met,
160

Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 414; see, e.g., Prosecution’s Reply under Rule
89(1) to the Application for Participation of Applicants a/0106/06 to a/0110/06,
a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0188/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06,
a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06 and a/0224/06 to a/0250/06 (Pre-Trial
Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-346 (June 25, 2007) (the Prosecutor makes a distinction
between “situation victims” and “case victims”).
161
Greco, supra note 140, at 537 n.30.
162
Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 414.
163
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 58.
164
Greco, supra note 140, at 537 n.31.
165
Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 414.
166
Greco, supra note 140, at 537 n.31.
167
See Cohen, supra note 143, at 365–65.
168
See generally Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 68(3); Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 157, at Rule 85.
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increasing the role that victims may play.
a.

Statutory Criteria for Participation

Article 68(3), along with Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, provide the participatory framework by which the legal
rights of victims are granted for the various proceedings within a
169
It is this portion of the victim participation
situation and a case.
mechanism that is the most fluid, as the pre-trial chambers struggle to
articulate a coherent set of standards and tests for admitting qualified
victims and delineating their modes of participation. In its first
decision regarding victim participation, PTC I relied on the strict
language of Rule 85(a) to enumerate the four requirements a victim
must satisfy to gain the legal right to participate: the victim must be
(1) a natural person; (2) who has suffered harm; (3) resulting from a
crime under the jurisdiction of the court; and (4) there must be a
170
causal link between the alleged crime and the harm.
Subsequent decisions by the pre-trial chambers and the appeals
171
chamber have provided more specific guidelines for these criteria.
With regard to the first criterion, Single Judge Kuenyehia of PTC I,
overseeing the Darfur situation, determined that a deceased person is
172
not a “natural person” within the meaning of Rule 85. Therefore,
victims may only file on behalf of themselves as natural persons, as
well as on behalf of minors, the disabled, and any individual who has
given his or her consent, as in a situation where the person is still in a
173
conflict zone and is unable to file on his or her own behalf.
Regarding the second criterion, the harm suffered by the person
seeking victim status may be material or economic, physical, and/or
169

Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 68(3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
supra note 157, at Rule 85.
170
Decision on the Applications for the Participation of the Proceedings of VPRS
1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber I), ¶ 79, No.
ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr (Jan. 17, 2006); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 157, at Rule 85(a); Cohen, supra note 143, at 367.
171
See generally Cohen, supra note 143, at 366–70.
172
Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for Participation in the
Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to
a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Single Judge) ¶ 36,
No. ICC-02/05-111-Corr (Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Corrigendum to Decision on
Applicants 2007]; Cohen, supra note 143, at 368.
173
See generally Standard Application Form to Participate in Proceedings Before
the International Criminal Court for Individual Victims and Persons Acting on Their
Behalf [hereinafter Old Application Form]; Application Form for Individuals:
Request for Participation in Proceedings and Reparations at the ICC for Individual
Victims [hereinafter New Application Form].
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174

emotional or psychological.
So long as the individual suffered
personally, he or she qualifies, regardless of whether the suffering was
175
direct or indirect.
The criteria necessary to qualify as an institutional victim under
Rule 85(b) are virtually identical to those required for individuals,
save that the victim must be an organization or institution, the
property of which is “dedicated to religion, education, art or science
or charitable purposes,” or is a “historic monument . . . , hospital . . .
176
or other place . . . and object . . . for humanitarian purposes.” The
only difference—and it is a significant one—is that with regard to the
harm criterion, an institution or organization must suffer direct harm;
the institution or organization cannot become a victim through
177
indirect harm. In addition, the person filing on behalf of such an
institution or organization must submit documents sufficient to
178
establish locus standi (standing) to act on that institution’s behalf.
The court will consider any document in accordance with the
domestic law of the country in question for proof of the legal status of
the institution and proof of the applicant’s own standing within the
institution when determining whether to allow the individual to file
179
on its behalf. Thus the requirements for obtaining victim status as
an institution or organization are slightly more onerous than those
for an individual, given that the harm suffered by the property must
be direct and that the person who is filing on its behalf must legally
180
be permitted to do so under the laws of his or her own country.
174

Corrigendum to Decision on Applicants 2007, at ¶¶ 30, 38–50; Judgment on the
appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defense against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on
Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008 (Appeals Chamber), ¶ 1, No. ICC-01/0401/06-1432, July 11, 2008 [hereinafter Judgment on the Appeals 2008].
175
Judgment on the Appeals 2008, at ¶¶ 38–39. The distinction between direct and
indirect harm comes into play when “harm suffered by one victim as a result of the
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court . . . give[s] rise to harm
suffered by other victims.” Id. at ¶ 32. The court gives the example of the child
soldier: the child suffers directly and his parents suffer indirectly; both would qualify
as victims in the ICC (so long as they met the other requirements). Id.
176
Corrigendum to the Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in
Connection with the Investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (PreTrial Chamber I, Single Judge), No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, ¶ 140 (Jan. 31, 2008)
[hereinafter Corrigendum to Investigation in DRC]; Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
supra note 157, at Rule 85(b).
177
Corrigendum to Investigation in DRC, at ¶ 141; Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
supra note 157, at Rule 85(b).
178
Corrigendum to Investigation in DRC, at ¶142.
179
Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation (Pre-Trial Chamber III, Single
Judge), ¶ 53, No. ICC-01/05-01/08-320 (Dec. 12, 2008).
180
See id.
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The provision allowing for institutions and organizations to
qualify as victims in order to be legally represented before the court is
181
heavily under-utilized.
What is particularly curious and useful
about the definition of qualified institutions is that the language
mirrors, almost precisely, that contained in the article on the war
182
crime of attacking protected objects.
Thus, there is enormous
potential for a wide array of cultural institutions to be able to
183
promote their interests before the court—not just for reparations
but also with regard to their purposeful destruction. To date,
however, only two institutions have availed themselves of this
mechanism. In the first, a headmaster filed on behalf of his
destroyed school, in the situation of the Democratic Republic of the
184
Congo. His application was granted, as the court determined that
his application met all of the Rule 85(b) requirements and was
185
In
properly substantiated by legal documents showing standing.
the second, a priest filed on behalf of his destroyed church, in the
186
Bemba case in the Central African Republic situation.
His
application was denied because he had filled out the application
form incorrectly—he had filed on behalf of himself and the
institution on the same form—and he had also failed to provide
187
sufficient documentation of his legal standing.
Aside from meeting the objective criteria of a victim, there is one
final requirement that both a human victim and an institutional
188
victim must meet.
In order to participate in proceedings, the
189
The
“personal interests” of that victim must be affected.
190
interpretation of this phrase has caused some controversy. The ICC
181

Only two institutions have thus far filed for status. See generally THE OFFICE OF
THE PUBLIC COUNSEL FOR VICTIMS, REPRESENTING VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A MANUAL FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES 50 (2011) [hereinafter OPCV
MANUAL].
182

See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 8(b)(2)(ix); Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 157, at Rule 85(b).
183
This Comment will not address the question of reparations.
184
OPCV MANUAL, supra note 181, at 50.
185
See Corrigendum to the Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in
Connection with the Investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (PreTrial Chamber I, Single Judge), ¶ 139–143, No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG (Jan. 31,
2008).
186
OPCV MANUAL, supra note 181, at 50.
187
See Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation (Pre-Trial Chamber III, Single
Judge), ¶ 53–56, No. ICC-01/05-01/08-320 (Dec. 12, 2008).
188
Cohen, supra note 143, at 368.
189
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 157, at Rule 68(3).
190
Compare Décision sur les demandes de participation à la procédure de VPRS1,
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chambers have interpreted it to require a reassessment of personal
interest for every new proceeding in which a victim wishes to
participate; this is separate and distinct from “the entire
191
proceedings,” or the trial itself.
Accordingly, in some types of
proceedings—largely procedural—victims’ requests to participate will
192
be denied because the personal interests will be too tenuous.
Recent jurisprudence has in fact established that, contrary to previous
decisions by the three pre-trial chambers, a victim does not have a
general procedural status of victim in the situation or investigation
193
phase.
This, however, does not preclude victims from petitioning
to participate in each individual proceeding taking place within the
194
But it does require them to restate their
investigative phase.
personal interests in the specific proceeding in which they would like
to participate; once they qualify, the victims are not automatically
allowed to participate in every proceeding brought before the
195
chamber in the situation.
Participation in a case, on the other hand, is not so rigid. Once
the prosecutor files charges, the chamber reassesses the victims who
have already been accepted into the situation phase to determine
whether they fulfill the additional requirement for participation in a
196
case. There must be a “sufficient causal link between the harm they
have suffered and the crimes for which there are reasonable grounds
197
to believe that [the accused] bears criminal responsibility.” For new
applications, the prospective victim must meet all of the objective
criteria from Rule 85(a) or (b), allege sufficient personal interest,
and establish a sufficient causal link between the harm and the

VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 et VPRS 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04101-tEN-Corr (Jan. 17, 2006), with Decision on Victims’ Participation in Proceedings
Relating to the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Pre-Trial
Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-593 (Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Decision on Victims’
Participation in DRC].
191
Cohen, supra note 143, at 368.
192
Id.
193
See Decision on Victims’ Participation in Proceedings Related to the Situation
in the Republic of Kenya (Pre-Trial Chamber II), No. ICC-01/09-24, 3 November
2010 [hereinafter Decision on Victims’ Participation in Kenya]; Decision on Victims’
Participation in DRC.
194
Decision on Victims’ Participation in DRC, at ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
195
See generally Decision on Victims’ Participation in Kenya, supra note 193.
196
Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings Submitted
by VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 in the Case of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Pre-Trial
Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-01/06-172-tEN, at pg. 6/9 (June 29, 2006).
197
Id.
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crimes for which the accused was indicted. Once a person has been
granted victim status in a case, that status is permanent for the entire
199
duration of the trial, as the trial itself is considered a proceeding.
The person need not resubmit a reassessment of personal interest for
each phase or proceeding within the trial.
b.

Participatory Rights

In addition to the more restricted right to participate in the
prosecution process such as in initiating investigations and
challenging jurisdiction and admissibility, there are various other
200
ways and other proceedings by which victims may participate. One
201
such proceeding is the confirmation of charges hearing. Once the
accused is brought before the court, the charges against him must be
202
In Prosecutor v. Thomas
confirmed so that the trial may begin.
203
Lubanga, the first before the ICC, the victims’ legal representatives
were allowed to give opening and closing statements, although they
were limited to making only legal observations and not presenting
204
facts or personal statements.
The same four Lubanga victims who
participated in the confirmation of charges hearing were, during the
actual trial phase, “allowed to present their view in written and oral
form with regard to all the procedural and substantive issues that
205
arose.”

198

See generally id.
Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of the
proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of the Pre-Trial
Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, No. ICC-01/04556, ¶ 45 (Dec. 19, 2008), (a “proceeding” is “a term denoting a judicial cause
pending before a Chamber.”).
200
See Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 425–30.
201
Id. at 428.
202
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 61.
203
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was the alleged commander-in-chief of the UPC and
FPLC militia forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo, from September 2002
until at least the end of 2003. Democratic Republic of Congo—ICC-01/04-01/06, The
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/Related
+Cases/ICC+0104+0106/Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo.htm (last visited Jan.
20, 2012). He is charged with the war crimes of “enlisting and conscripting of
children under the age of 15 into the [FPLC] and using them to participate actively
in hostilities” in an international armed conflict and non-international armed
conflict. Id.
204
Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 429.
205
Id.
199
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206

One of the principal decisions
handed down on victim
participation also stated that victims may present and examine
evidence; ask appropriate questions whenever the evidence presented
affects their personal interests; access all public (and therefore
redacted) information presented by the prosecution and defense;
and “participate in closed and ex parte hearings depending on the
207
circumstances.”
For those victims who also have legal
representation—whether individual or common, court-appointed or
chosen—their participatory rights can extend past procedural rights
208
and include the “questioning of witnesses, experts or the accused.”
Nevertheless, to some extent, victim participation is at the
discretion of the court, which must decide whether such participation
209
is appropriate.
A determination of appropriateness must balance
the rights of the accused, including the “right to a fair and
expeditious trial,” with the rights of the victims to present their views
210
and concerns when their personal interests are affected. The court
must also make sure that the burden of proof remains with the
prosecutor so that the victims do not become like a second
211
prosecutor.
As such, victims should refrain from making factual
accusations or independent legal conjectures about the evidence that
would disturb the prosecution’s case or inhibit the accused’s
212
defense.
Still, even within what would seem to be a rather limited or
restricted manner of participation by qualified victims, there is a
great deal of potential to influence the outcome of a proceeding. An
astute victim legal team would particularly tailor its representation to
highlight the weaker portions of the prosecutor’s case, buttress the
prosecutor’s evidence with strong witnesses and evidence of its own,
and, depending on the charges, paint for the court a more nuanced
cultural landscape than the prosecution might need to. The success
of this mechanism for victim participation—and apparent
206

Decision on Victims’ Participation (Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-01/061119 (Jan. 18, 2008).
207
Id. at ¶¶ 108, 110, 113; Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 429–30.
208
Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 430.
209
“The Court shall permit [participation by the victims] at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is
not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial.” Rome Statute, supra note 24, at Art. 68(3).
210
Cohen, supra note 143, at 371.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 373.
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recognition of the myriad benefits it brings—is evidenced by the
onslaught of victim applications that swamped the Victims
Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) during the brief
window that the court had set in anticipation of the confirmation of
213
charges hearing of Callixte Mbarushimana.
VPRS strongly
requested an extension so that it might process the 783 applications it
214
had received, of which 530 seemed to be complete.
The victim participation framework is a new mechanism in the
accountability process at the ICC, but its innovative features have
proved appealing to the international community and many victims
have applied for victim status in order to avail themselves of the
215
benefits. The potential to influence and enhance the trial process
is enormous for victims and their legal representatives. Specifically,
there are many opportunities during the proceedings to inject into
the process a different, more culture-oriented perspective.
Cultural genocide has been somewhat sidelined as a distinct
legal concept, even as it has been acknowledged as one way to prove
216
genocidal intent.
It has, however, a more versatile use in
highlighting the cultural background against which conflicts can be
analyzed; victim participation at the ICC can help to strengthen this
cultural context. It is important to note that victim participation is
not a way to get the crime of cultural genocide back into the Rome
213

First transmission to the Pre-Trial Chamber of applications to participate in
the proceedings (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Single Judge), No. ICC-01/04-01/10-166, at
pg. 3/6, 4/6 (May 20, 2011) [hereinafter First transmission to participate].
Mbarushimana was the “alleged executive secretary of the . . . FDLR-FCA,” a
Rwandan rebel group participating in the conflict in the DRC. Democratic Republic of
the Congo—ICC-01/04-01/10, the Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, INT’L CRIM.
COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations
/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc01040110/icc01040110?lan=en-GB
(last visited Jan. 20, 2012). He was charged with the crimes against humanity of
murder, torture, rape, inhuman acts, and persecution; and the war crimes of attacks
against the civilian population, murder, mutilation, torture, rape, inhuman
treatment, destruction of property, and pillaging. Id.
214
First transmission to participate, at pg. 3/6. The request was denied. Id. at pg.
5/6. On December 16, 2011, the PTC I declined to confirm the charges against
Mbarushimana and declared his release from ICC custody upon completion of the
necessary arrangements. Decision on the confirmation of charges (Pre-Trial
Chamber I) pg. 149/150, No. ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red (Dec. 16, 2011).
215
REGISTRY AND TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS FACT SHEET, MARCH 2011, COALITION
FOR
THE
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
COURT
1,
available
at
www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Victims_Factsheet_March_2011.18apr1832.p
df (“Since 2005, the [VPRS] has received a total of 4773 victims’ applications for
participation and 2031 for reparation” as of March 31, 2011).
216
See supra Part II.C.1.
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Statute in its own right. Cultural genocide is substantive law which is
not presently contained in the Rome Statute; the victim participation
mechanism is one procedure that can significantly affect the ICC’s
interpretation of genocide by infusing culture into the cases. As
such, victim participation can be an extremely useful instrument in
expressing the foundation of the concept that culture is an
undeniable and intertwined part of all proceedings by reminding the
court of past attacks on cultural life, buildings, and artifacts, and the
continuing decimating effects such acts are having on local culture
217
and identity.
In this sense, participation by both natural persons and
institutions or organizations will allow for slightly different
perspectives to be advanced and will reinforce different aspects of a
nation’s or group’s culture. The legal representatives of the victims
would be well-advised to take advantage of their unique position
within the trial proceedings to advance the charge for recognition of
cultural destruction as a legitimate consequence and oft-desired
result of attacks on individuals, villages, and communities. In the
absence of any provisions on cultural genocide or ethnic cleansing in
the Rome Statute—which would require that this type of evidence be
presented—the victims’ legal representatives would be able to
218
supplement the prosecutor’s case for other crimes and heighten
awareness of the cultural context in which the events at issue
occurred.
IV. APPLICATION TO THE CASE AGAINST SUDANESE PRESIDENT OMAR
AL-BASHIR
The victim participation framework, while still fluid, was tested
219
and tried in the first-ever case before the ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga.
Submitted for deliberation in August 2011, Trial Chamber I issued
the ICC’s first-ever verdict in March 2012, finding Lubanga guilty of
“the war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age
220
of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities.”
This
217

See, e.g., Air strikes and clashes continue in Darfur, RADIO DABANGA (Dec. 27,
2011), http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/22943.
218
It is important to note that the prosecutor cannot charge an accused with
cultural genocide because it is not contained in the Rome Statute. See generally Rome
Statute, supra note 24. She must therefore be careful about how to color her
genocide allegations—cultural harms can only be used to fortify her case as proof of
intent. See supra Part II.C.1.
219
Greco, supra note 140, at 546.
220
Press Release, Trial Chamber I to Deliberate on the Case Against Thomas
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Comment does not analyze the Lubanga victims’ participation and
instead focuses on the case against Sudanese President al-Bashir
because al-Bashir is the only person so far to have been indicted for
genocide, the crime most sensitive to cultural considerations—and
221
the reason why the al-Bashir case is so significant.
A. Charging Bashir with Genocide
The pre-trial chamber denied the prosecutor’s original request
222
for an arrest warrant for al-Bashir on charges of genocide—by
killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately
223
inflicting destructive conditions of life —on the grounds that,
despite the drawing of various inferences from the presentation of
evidence by the prosecutor, a conclusion of genocidal intent by al224
Bashir could not be the only reasonable conclusion drawn.
The
chamber reasoned that since there were other plausible
conclusions—for example, discrimination or persecution—there was

Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-CPI-20110826-PR714 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/ (page 2,
“26.08.2011”); Press Release, ICC First verdict: Thomas Lubanga guilty of
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to
participate in hostilities, ICC-CPI-20120314-PR776 (Mar. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/A70A5D27-18B4-4294-816F-BE68155242E0.htm.
221
Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest
(Pre-Trial Chamber I), ¶¶ 23–24, 30–31, 39–40, 43, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94 (July 12,
2010) [hereinafter Second Decision on Arrest Warrant].
222
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir is the President of the Republic of Sudan; he
has been in power since 1993. Darfur, Sudan—ICC-02/05-01/09, The Prosecutor v.
Omar
Hassan
Ahmad
Al
Bashir,
INT’L
CRIM.
COURT,
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%
20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/icc02050109?lan=en-GB (last visited
Jan. 20, 2012). He is alleged to be at the head of a Government of Sudan counterinsurgency campaign “to unlawfully attack . . . the [Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa]
civilian population of Darfur” as part of the conflict against the SLM/A, JEM, and
other militia groups, which are composed of members of those tribes. Warrant of
Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1 at pg. 5/8, (March
4, 2009). As such, he is charged with the crimes against humanity of murder,
extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape; the war crimes of intentionally
directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians
not taking part in hostilities, and pillaging; and genocide by killing, by causing
serious bodily or mental harm, and by deliberately inflicting on each target group
conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction. Id. at
pg. 7/8, 8/8; Second Decision on Arrest Warrant, at pg. 28/30.
223
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at articles 6(a)–(c).
224
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), ¶¶ 159, 205, No. ICC-02/0501/09-3, Mar. 4, 2009 [hereinafter First Decision on Arrest Warrant].
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225

no specific intent to commit genocide.
The prosecutor appealed the PTC’s decision not to issue an
arrest warrant on charges of genocide—though the chamber did
226
issue one for various war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
appeals chamber determined that the PTC had applied the incorrect
standard for determining genocidal intent—at least for the arrest
warrant stage—and that the proper standard is that only one of the
reasonable conclusions derived from the evidence presented need be
227
genocidal intent.
Upon remand, the PTC determined that the
inferences from the evidence did lead to a reasonable potential
conclusion of genocidal intent and issued a second warrant of arrest
for al-Bashir for charges of genocide by killing, causing serious bodily
or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting conditions of life
228
calculated to bring about physical destruction.
In its analysis of genocide and the intent necessary to warrant
charges, the PTC made a distinction between genocidal intent and
what it called persecutory intent—or the intent to “discriminate on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other
229
grounds.”
Both require dolus specialis, or specific intent, but the
230
objectives of the intention behind the targeting are different. One
is the intent to destroy in whole or in part; the other is intent to
231
discriminate. Such a distinction is highlighted in an analysis of the
225

Id. at ¶ 167.
Id. at pg. 92/95; Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the “Decision
on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir,” (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-12 (Mar. 13, 2009)
[hereinafter Prosecutor’s Appeal of Arrest Warrant].
227
Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the “Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir” (Appeals Chamber), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-73, ¶¶ 30, 39 (Feb. 3, 2010)
[hereinafter Judgment on Appeal of Arrest Warrant] (emphasis added). There is a multitiered approach within the Rome Statue for the burden of proof to be met by the
prosecutor during various stages of the trial: for the issuance of an arrest warrant,
“reasonable grounds to believe” suffices. Id. at ¶ 30. This is heightened to
“substantial grounds to believe” for the confirmation of charges hearing. Id.; Rome
Statute, supra note 24, at art. 61(7). The final threshold to be met for conviction is
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Judgment on Appeal of Arrest Warrant, at ¶ 30; Rome
Statute, supra note 24, at art. 66(3).
228
Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest
(Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94, ¶¶ 4–5 (July 12, 2010); Second
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No.
ICC-02/05-01/09-95, at pg. 8/9 (July 12, 2010).
229
First Decision on Arrest Warrant, supra note 224 at ¶ 141.
230
Id.
231
Id.
226
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232

policies of ethnic cleansing.
Ethnic cleansing does not necessarily
result in the destruction of a people; genocide is not the “automatic
233
As noted above,
consequence” of forcible displacement policies.
ethnic cleansing by itself is not considered a genocidal policy; it can
234
only be considered as evidence of genocidal intent.
“Genocide,
[however], is an extreme and most inhuman form of persecution”
235
and ethnic cleansing.
This means that it may be the case that a
policy of ethnic cleansing or persecution escalates into genocide; if
the objective elements are met along with the specific intent, such
236
policies may reach the level of prosecutable genocide.
237
Al-Bashir is not charged with persecution, a crime against
humanity, but elements of what would be evidence of persecution
may be used as evidence of genocide and genocidal intent because
238
the difference is one of degree. That does not mean, however, that
239
such evidence would be sufficient on its own.
On the contrary, it
would need to be accompanied by direct or indirect evidence of, for
example: (1) a strategy to “deny and conceal the crimes” being
committed against the targeted groups; (2) official statements and
documents referencing or providing inferences of a genocidal policy,
whether already in existence or in formation; and (3) “the nature
240
and extent of the acts of violence” being committed.
Proving alBashir’s specific intent to commit genocide, required for a conviction
of genocide, will be extremely difficult for the prosecutor, as was
evidenced by the PTC’s initial rejection of the prosecutor’s request
for an arrest warrant on charges of genocide—despite its initial
241
application of the incorrect standard.
In its impugned first decision on the application for the arrest
232

Sirkin, supra note 10, at 505–09.
Id. at ¶ 144 (quoting Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 190 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter ICJ Judgment on Genocide].
234
See supra Part II.C.2.
235
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 142
(Mar. 4, 2009) (quoting ICJ Judgment on Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. 7 at ¶ 188).
236
Id. at ¶¶ 142, 145.
237
See id.
238
Id. at ¶¶ 142–43.
239
Id. at ¶ 145.
240
Id. at ¶ 164.
241
See Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶¶
159, 205 (Mar. 4, 2009).
233
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warrant, the PTC pointed to the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ)
Decision on Genocide that analyzed whether genocide had been
committed anywhere else outside of Srebrenica during the Yugoslav
242
wars. The ICJ found that despite
the mass killings of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim
civilians and prisoners of war; the mass rapes of tens of
thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilian women; the
deportation and forcible displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians; the widespread and
systematic beatings, torture and inhumane treatment
(malnutrition and poor health conditions) in dozens of
detention camps throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina; the
siege of Bosnian Muslim civilians in cities through Bosnia
and Herzegovina, such as Sarajevo, where shelling, sniping
and starvation by hindering humanitarian aid was a matter
of course; and the destruction of cultural, religious and historical
property in an attempt to wipe out traces of the existence of the
Bosnian-Muslim group from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
such evidence was insufficient to support an inference of genocidal
243
The chamber then compared
intent by Bosnian-Serb leadership.
the evidence that had been presented to the ICJ in the Bosnia
genocide case with that which had been presented to the ICC
chamber in the Bashir genocide case, namely that the Government of
Sudan forces had
carried out numerous unlawful attacks, followed by
systematic acts of pillage, on towns and villages, mainly
inhabited by civilians belonging to the Fur, Masalit and
Zaghawa groups; subjected thousands of civilians, belonging
primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups to acts of
murder, as well as acts of extermination; subjected
thousands of civilian women, belonging primarily to the
said groups to acts of rape; subjected hundreds of
thousands of civilians belonging primarily to the said
groups to acts of forcible transfer; and subjected civilians
belonging primarily to the said groups to acts of torture,
and found that while such evidence strongly supported a finding of
serious war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could not be
extended to a finding of the commission of genocide (or a finding of
244
the specific intent for genocide).
242
243
244

Id. at ¶ 194.
Id. at ¶ 194 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at ¶¶ 192–93.
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Of the evidence presented by the prosecutor to show genocidal
intent, the only reference to any kind of cultural destruction was the
“unlawful arrest of community leaders and [their] subsequent
mistreatment/torture” at the hands of the former members of the
245
Sudanese secret police.
Since the prosecutor will be fighting an
increasingly uphill battle in proving genocide as the trial process
proceeds, she should use every possible method to bolster his case for
showing specific intent. This includes evidence of ethnic cleansing,
persecution, and cultural destruction.
B. Using Culture to Prove the Specific Intent of Genocide in Darfur
The insertion of a cultural perspective into the future
proceedings of the case against Sudanese President al-Bashir is not
only going to be a useful exercise, but also an imperative one. The
media has been hesitant to call the violence occurring in Darfur,
246
raging since 2003, a genocide. The first high-profile political actor
to brand Darfur a genocide was then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell in 2004, who presented to the United Nations and to the U.S.
247
Congress the findings of a U.S. Department of State report.
Powell’s testimony was immediately followed by an official statement
248
from former President George W. Bush.
In fact, most countries
and organizations have shied away from labeling the atrocities a
genocide, sticking instead to the lesser designation of crimes against
249
humanity.
The United States, as well, later backpedaled on its
250
statements.

245

Id. at ¶ 178.
See generally HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 12, at 79–93.
247
The Crisis in Darfur: Hearing Before the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., supra note 11
(“When we reviewed the evidence . . . we concluded, I concluded, that genocide has
been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear
responsibility—and that genocide may still be occurring. . . .”).
248
HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 12, at 80 (“As a result of [Secretary
Powell’s team of investigators] we have concluded that genocide has taken place in
Darfur. We urge the international community to work with us to prevent and
suppress acts of genocide. We call on the United Nations to undertake a full
investigation of the genocide and other crimes in Darfur.”) (quoting Office of the
Press Secretary, President’s Statement on Violence in Darfur, Sudan, Sept. 9, 2004,
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09
/20040909-10.html).
249
Mai-Linh K. Hong, Note, A Genocide by Any Other Name: Language, Law, and the
Response to Darfur, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 235, 237–38 (2008).
250
See HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 12, at 85–93.
246
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The Specter of the Holocaust

The main reason for such an aversion to the use of the term is
the fact that the inspiration behind the Genocide Convention—and
the clearest, most unequivocal example of genocide to date—was the
Holocaust; the “genocides” occurring in today’s world do not and will
251
not look anything like the Holocaust.
Thus because Darfur does
not look and feel like Europe in the 1940s, it cannot actually be a
252
Such a comparison is absurd and countertrue or real genocide.
productive—how many people must die, in what manner, and with
how much governmental documentation before the world calls it
genocide? One of the legacies of the Holocaust was the thousands of
253
laws, orders, and documents (including diary entries)
that
systematically and in great detail illustrated the evolution of the
Nazis’ “gigantic scheme to change, in favor of Germany, the balance
of biological forces between it and the captive nations for many years
254
to come.” The Nuremberg Tribunal used this evidence to conclude
that the crime against humanity with which the first set of defendants
was charged—and under which genocide was subsumed—”ha[d]
255
been proved in the greatest detail.”
It is true that in Darfur, there is no “absolutely clear, well256
documented intent to destroy.”
There are “[n]o public
251

See Hong, supra note 249, at 261.
“If this is a genocide, it doesn’t look very much like those we’ve known
before.” Scott Anderson, How Did Darfur Happen?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, § 6
(Magazine)
at
52,
56,
available
at
http://nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magainze/17DARFUR.html.
253
SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 39 (Hans Frank testified before the Nuremberg
Tribunal in his own defense and said, “[W]e have allowed ourselves to make
utterances and my own diary has become a witness against me in this
connection. . . .”).
254
LEMKIN, supra note 3, at xi. Lemkin’s book contains hundreds of pages of
painstakingly analyzed and transcribed laws, orders, decrees, acts, proclamations, and
instructions that underpinned the Nazi policies. See id. at xvii–xxxviii [Contents].
255
France et al. v. Goering et al., 22 IMT 203, 408 (1946). There were twentythree defendants, among whom perhaps the most infamous was Hermann Wilhelm
Goering. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS
CRIMINALITY, 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION III (1946). Some of the documents
relied on by the Tribunal included “the personal and official correspondence of
Alfred Rosenberg, together with a great quantity of Nazi Party correspondence;”
“thirty-nine leather-bound volumes containing detailed inventories of the art
treasures of Europe that had been looted;” “485 tons of crated papers [which
contained] the records of the German Foreign Office from 1837 to 1944;” and over
“300 crates of German High Command files, 85 notebooks containing minutes from
Hitler’s conferences, and the complete files of the German Navy.” Id. at vi.
256
Hong, supra note 249, at 262.
252
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proclamations about ‘the enemy within,’ no extermination lists.”
“Instead, it is shadowy, informal; the killing takes place offstage. It is
the destruction of a people in a place where it is virtually impossible
to distinguish incompetence from conspiracy. Is that by design, the
sheer evil genius of it all, or just more evidence of a government’s
258
Thus, the fundamental question is whether
utter haplessness?”
there can be genocide where “there has never been a stable,
technocratic regime or a bureaucracy to plan, execute, and
259
document an orderly mass killing.” Or perhaps the more pertinent
question would be, in light of the condemnatory nature of the
German official records, whether there will ever be another genocide
with such an obvious paper trail. The answer would seem to be no.
The representatives present during the drafting of the Genocide
Convention wanted to include a requirement for government
260
involvement in the definition of genocide, but did not. Therefore,
while as a general rule government is usually complicit in the
commission of genocide, it is not beyond the scope of interpretation
that the definition could be applied to genocide occurring without
261
any governmental oversight. Even putting that aside, there will be
nary a government that would risk enacting laws or publishing
decrees that would enumerate genocidal policies.
This Comment will assume that, for the purposes of the
following analysis, genocide can indeed occur under circumstances
where there seems to be little or no coordination with the
government. Of course, “without documentation produced by a state
bureaucracy with a genocidal mission, the burden of proving intent is
262
great.”
The PTC acknowledged as much when it concluded that,
inter alia, the paucity of official statements from the Government of
Sudan was insufficient to lead to a conclusion that genocidal intent
263
was the only reasonable inference drawn from the evidence.
It
therefore becomes crucial for the cultural context in which the
violence has taken place to be vividly painted for the trial chamber so
257

Anderson, supra note 252.
Id.
259
Hong, supra note 249, at 262.
260
SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 65.
261
Id. Nevertheless, this restriction on the definition was left out largely due to
“practical difficulties.” Id. (quoting U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, at 6).
262
Hong, supra note 249, at 262.
263
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 165
(Mar. 4, 2009).
258
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that the chamber can make the determination that while Darfur does
not bear the same features as the Holocaust, it could also be a
genocide. The legal representatives of the victims are uniquely
situated to take on this important task, as they have the most direct
and sustained contact with Darfuris—either on the ground as
internally-displaced persons (IDPs) or as refugees.
2.

Cultural Life in Darfur

The territory of Darfur—meaning “Land of the Fur”—is in West
264
Sudan and is approximately the size of France.
It is home to
anywhere from forty to ninety tribes, members of which are primarily
identified both internally and externally as either Arab or non265
Arab. The three main non-Arab tribes, the tribes almost exclusively
266
targeted by Sudanese military forces and the Janjaweed militia, are
267
the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. They speak Arabic, as it is the lingua
franca of the country, but also maintain their tribal languages, which
play very important roles in passing down histories, stories, and
268
culture by way of oral tradition. Each tribe also has its own customs,
traditions, and religious beliefs, the hybridization of which creates the
269
Still, each tribe
overarching, all-encompassing Darfuri culture.
protects its own personalized part of the culture, with art forms,
270
dances, and celebrations.
The tribal village is traditionally based on kinship and a sense of
familial community, as most of the people living in the village are
271
related to each other.
Every Darfuri tribe and its culture is very
272
closely attached to its land, which has sustained it for centuries.
Each village has a central meeting area called the dara, where
264

Hong, supra note 249, at 244; DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 5.
MEENU MENON, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DARFUR: THE CULTURE AND THE
PEOPLE, available at http://rhin.org/documents/DARFUR_THE_CULTURE_AND
_THE_PEOPLE_English.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
266
The Janjaweed are informally organized Arab militias, who have joined with
the Sudanese government in attacking the Darfuri tribes. HAGAN & RYMONDRICHMOND, supra note 12, at 108. The translation of “Janjaweed” is “evil [or devil] on
horseback.” Rebecca Leung, Witnessing Genocide In Sudan, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009,
7:49 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/10/08/60minutes/main648277
.shtml.
267
MENON, supra note 265.
268
Id.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
265

HON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2013 3:37 PM

COMMENT

401
273

villagers eat meals, socialize, resolve disputes, and discuss the news.
The children of the village are also schooled in the dara, learning
their tribal history, genealogy, and culture from their grandparents,
274
particularly their grandmothers.
Special religious scholars also
275
These
hold sessions for villagers to learn and read the Quran.
scholars, along with the tribal village chief and the traditional
healers—whose vocation is passed down from generation to
generation—are the most important members of the community and
are highly respected.
3.

Effect of the Violence on Cultural Life

The widespread atrocities occurring in Darfur have certainly not
gone unnoticed and there is much documentation detailing the
276
violence. One of the most comprehensive reports of the violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law in Darfur is
contained in the “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur to the Secretary-General” (“Darfur Report”), the
compilation of which was authorized by the U.N. Security Council in
277
Resolution 1564 in September 2004.
The Commission requested,
and received, materials from various sources “including
Governments, intergovernmental organizations, various United
Nations mechanisms or bodies, . . . non-governmental organizations,”
278
and “international and regional organizations.” Witness interviews
provided most of the information contained in the reports that
flooded the Commission, though some information was also gleaned
from satellite imagery tracing destruction of, and attacks on, villages
279
and field visits.
Despite the fact that the Commission did not find sufficient
280
evidence to justify a conclusion that genocide was being committed,
273

MENON, supra note 265.
Id.
275
Id.
276
Reports have been compiled by the U.N., governments, and nongovernmental organizations. See HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 12, at xvii–
xx, 3 (The Atrocities Documentation Survey conducted by the U.S. State
Department); Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur to the Secretary-General [hereinafter Darfur Report], delivered to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 31, 2005); DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9.
277
Darfur Report, supra note 276, at 2.
278
Id. at ¶ 182.
279
Id. at ¶ 183.
280
“There is no doubt that some of the objective elements of genocide
materialized in Darfur. . . . However, . . . other . . . elements . . . show a lack of
274
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there is much to support such a finding once the cultural nuances
are properly taken into account. In reviewing all of the materials sent
to the Commission, it reported “hundreds of incidents . . . involving
the killing of civilians, massacres, summary executions, rape and
other forms of sexual violence, torture, abduction, looting of
property and livestock, as well as deliberate destruction and torching
281
of villages.”
The villages are left “burned, completely or partially,
with only shells of outer walls of the traditional circular houses left
standing[, with w]ater pumps and wells . . . destroyed, implements for
food processing wrecked, [and] trees and crops burned and cut
282
down.”
But it is not just the villages and rural areas being
283
Many towns
attacked—towns and cities are not immune either.
“show signs of damage to homes and essential infrastructure such as
284
hospitals, schools and police stations.”
Another comprehensive report is “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic
Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan,”
compiled independently by Human Rights Watch (HRW); the report
is the result of a twenty-five day field mission by members of HRW
285
into Darfur. In addition to many of the same findings of bombings,
mass and summary killings, and rape, HRW also found “systematic
286
destruction of mosques and the desecration of articles of Islam.”
Government forces and the Janjaweed militia “have killed imams[,
second imams, and muezzins], destroyed mosques and prayer mats,
287
[and] torn up and defecated on Qorans.”
Such arbitrary and disproportionate violence has led to “massive
displacement of large parts of the civilian population within Darfur
288
and to neighboring Chad.”
The severity and repetition of attacks
against the same or surrounding villages often spread fear
throughout the area, leading entire villages to evacuate and flee to
289
more relatively safe areas. At the time that the Darfur Commission

genocidal intent. . . . On the basis of the foregoing observations, the Commission
concludes that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.”
Id. at ¶¶ 507, 513, 518.
281
Id. at ¶ 186.
282
Id. at ¶ 235.
283
Darfur Report, supra note 276, at ¶ 235.
284
Id.
285
DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 2.
286
Id. at 27.
287
Id. at 28.
288
Id.
289
Darfur Report, supra note 276, at ¶ 186.
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submitted its report to the United Nations, the estimate for refugees
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) numbered around 1.2
290
Those in the IDP camps
million, with over 700 villages destroyed.
291
do not fare any better, being akin to “virtual prisoners.”
They are
“confined to camps and settlements with inadequate food, shelter
and humanitarian assistance, at constant risk of further attacks, rape
292
and looting of their remaining possessions.” The displaced do not
want to stay in the camps, yet they fear even more returning to their
homes because of the probability of more attacks, attacks occurring
293
with impunity against the civilians.
In addition, members of the
Janjaweed sometimes “camp” in the villages they have burned, thus
294
From these makeshift
ensuring that its inhabitants do not return.
bases, the Janjaweed “mount[] raids across the border into Chad and
exert[] some control over the movement of displaced persons. Their
mere presence close to the border ensure[s] that refugees in Chad
[do] not attempt to cross back into Darfur to salvage buried grain or
295
other belongings.”
The destruction of entire villages’ and communities’ ways of life
is undeniably having a profound impact on local tribal culture. HRW
concluded in its report that the human rights violations it witnessed
“amount[ed] to a government policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of certain
ethnic groups, namely the Fur and the Masalit, from their areas of
296
residence.” Ethnic cleansing, which has a cultural element to it, is
297
also evidence of a genocidal policy. Civilians are being subjected to
“attacks directed against [them], the burning of their villages, the
mass killings of persons under their control, the forced displacement
of populations, the destruction of their food stocks, livelihoods and
the looting of their livestock by government and militia forces,” the
mistreatment, arrest, imprisonment, and torture of their tribal chiefs,
290

Id. at ¶¶ 226, 236. The report was submitted in 2005. See id.
Id. at ¶ 196.
292
Id. For example, Kalma camp, located in South Darfur near the city of Nyala,
is facing dire food and water shortages. Radio Dabanga, Sudan: Food and Water
AFRICA,
Nov.
1,
2011,
Shortage
in
Kalma
Camp,
ALL
http://allafrica.com/stories/201111021026.html. The humanitarian coordinator for
the camp said that the camp has not received food for two months, and they are low
on fuel so they cannot run the water pumps. Id. He accused the Sudanese
government of intentionally restricting the delivery of supplies to the camp. Id.
293
Darfur Report, supra note 276, at ¶ 197.
294
DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 34.
295
Id.
296
Id. at 39.
297
See supra Part II.C.2.
291
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and the violation and destruction of their religious buildings and
298
These hardships are wrenching the tightly knit and
objects.
kinship-based tribes from their land and tearing family members
apart. Once they are forced off their land, these bonds are further
eroded at the IDP camps, which are in unenviable humanitarian
299
condition, and are themselves subject to more attacks. All of these
actions have the cumulative effect of destroying the cultural ties that
bind the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.
C. Linking Cultural Destruction to Proving Genocide
Being able to depict this cultural state of affairs accurately and
prominently for the trial chamber at the ICC will have profound
consequences for the prosecution of Sudanese President al-Bashir for
genocide. The legal representatives of the victims should seize the
opportunity to increase the role that they play at the ICC—within the
modalities of participation that the court has granted them, of
course. This is important to note; there are limitations to the role
300
that victims can play.
They can only use the methods of
participation that are specified by the statute and authorized by the
301
court.
Nevertheless, by complementing the evidence that the
prosecutor will be presenting, the representative of the victims can
help to buttress her argument for genocide by helping to show two
elements of the crime of genocide: the first is whether the Fur,
Masalit and Zaghawa tribes fall under the four enumerated
“protected groups;” the second is whether there was a specific intent
302
to commit genocide.
Scholars have thoroughly dealt with the first element, on the
status of the three tribes as protected groups under the Genocide
303
Convention, elsewhere and it will not be re-analyzed here.
The
second, however, has not yet been sufficiently assessed. The PTC, in
denying a warrant of arrest for al-Bashir for genocide due to lack of
specific intent, noted that the documents and official statements that
the prosecutor submitted as evidence of such intent could just as
304
easily be proof of discrimination or persecution. What will help to
298

DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 40.
Darfur Report, supra note 276, at ¶ 327. Women in particular are in danger of
rape at the camps. Id.
300
See Cohen, supra note 143, at 352–55.
301
Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 425.
302
See supra Part II.C and II.D.
303
See, e.g., Hong, supra note 249.
304
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
299
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support those documents will be a strong showing of persecution and
ethnic cleansing policies pursued by the joint and separate attacks by
the Sudanese military forces and the Janjaweed militia.
In fact, there is such evidence suggesting that the intent of the
Government of Sudan and its proxies, the Janjaweed militia, is to
destroy, whether in its entirety or partially, the non-Arab tribes of the
305
Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa.
The powerful findings of the clear
306
commission of the crime against humanity of persecution, the
307
crime against humanity of extermination, and the undeniable
308
ethnic cleansing —primarily through forced displacement and
forcible transfer—attest to this. Persecution and ethnic cleansing are
both policies on a sliding scale of specific intent, and their coupling
provides at least a strong argument that those policies are
309
genocidal.
Of the three types of genocide with which the prosecutor has
charged al-Bashir—genocide by killing, genocide by causing serious
bodily or mental harm, and genocide by deliberately inflicting
310
conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction —
the charge most amenable to cultural buttressing as articulated above
is the final one. The shattering of entire communities and villages
forcing displacement into camps, which are not safe from attack
either, is wrenching apart the strong cultural bonds between tribal
members and forcing them from the land they have occupied and
311
claimed for hundreds of years.
In addition to atrocious living
conditions, the loss of their support system, cultural histories and
genealogies, and traditional forms of livelihood is straining the
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 167
(Mar. 4, 2009).
305
Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest
(Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94, ¶ 5 (July 12, 2010).
306
Bashir is not charged with the crime against humanity of persecution,
interestingly, even though the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur came to the
conclusion that such a crime was being committed. See Darfur Report, supra note 276,
at ¶ 321.
307
See id. at ¶ 294 (“The Commission leaves it to the competent court that will
pronounce on these alleged crimes to determine whether the mass killings may
amount to extermination as a crime against humanity.”).
308
See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 39.
309
See generally supra Parts II.C.2 and IV.A.
310
While the one provision of the definition of cultural genocide was included in
the Rome Statute—that of forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group—and as such would be the greatest beneficiary of cultural context, al-Bashir is
not charged with genocide by forcible transfer of children.
311
MENON, supra note 265.
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identity of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.
As Raphael
Lemkin stated in his seminal articulation of genocide, the destruction
of the foundational elements of the life of national groups is the
313
means by which to annihilate the groups themselves. Accordingly,
culture, and the impact that the violence in Darfur is having on it,
will play a very important role in the prosecution for genocide. By
incorporating numerous and powerful references to the culture of
the tribes and the disastrous consequences of the attacks, the legal
representatives of the victims will be able to help develop modern
genocide jurisprudence, leaving behind the more structured example
314
of the Holocaust, and bringing to justice arguably one of the
315
savviest (or most “hapless” ) perpetrators of genocide the world has
ever seen.
V. CONCLUSION
The creation of the Genocide Convention following the horrors
of World War II was a missed opportunity for the international
community to criminalize the intentional destruction, “in whole or in
316
part,” of a nation’s culture and identity—cultural genocide. While
the first two drafts contained strong provisions for the protection of
culture and its tangible manifestations, the final result contained
317
none.
Subsequent events in the world, namely the wars in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, forced the international community to
rethink its position on the complete absence of cultural genocide as a
legal concept. The ICTY’s jurisprudence carved out a niche for the
use of cultural genocide as one method for contributing to the
showing of specific intent for the conviction of traditional
318
genocide.
The establishment of the ICC, a permanent institution dedicated
to the pursuance of accountability and justice of perpetrators of
international criminal law violations, briefly reopened debate about
whether to incorporate cultural genocide as a separate crime in its
319
founding statute. Despite the fact that the international community

312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319

Id.
See supra Part I and II.A.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
Hong, supra note 249, at 261.
See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 5.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra Part II.D.
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declined to do so, the statute does contain a unique and
revolutionary provision: it provides for the legal representation of
certified victims before the court in a capacity comparable to a third
320
party in a case.
Some modes of participation are proscribed for
those representatives, but they are nevertheless allowed to engage in
many of the same proceedings, and participate within them, as the
prosecution and the defense do. This novel mechanism has the
potential to inject cultural recognition and awareness into the trials,
as the representatives will have the closest contact with the victims
who experienced the attacks, and will have as great an interest in
securing convictions for genocide as the prosecutor.
The case against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is the
perfect test case for the use of victim participation as a means of
getting evidence of cultural genocide in as evidence of genocidal
321
intent, as contemplated and acknowledged by the ICTY.
The
attacks and destruction on tribal villages in Darfur are ripping
communities apart and uprooting centuries-old villages that have
strong ties to the land and surrounding area. The killing of civilians,
arrest and torture of tribal chiefs, and herding of the survivors into
camps for the internally-displaced is only continuing to threaten the
322
tribal identities of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. The prosecution
will have a difficult time as it is proving genocide because of the
dearth of concrete documentary evidence of specific intent to
destroy. It would behoove the legal representatives of the victims to
take advantage of their unique position within the legal structure of
the court to fervently present to the court the cultural context in
which the violence is taking place. Because the events in Darfur do
not resemble what is considered the epitome of genocide, the
323
Holocaust, the representatives should urge that without the cultural
context, the genocidal attacks occurring cannot be properly
324
interpreted, and justice cannot be served.
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323
324

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.2–3.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
See supra Part IV.B.

